{"id":1566,"date":"2016-08-30T15:30:16","date_gmt":"2016-08-30T22:30:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/leanqualitysystems.com\/?p=1566"},"modified":"2016-08-30T15:32:51","modified_gmt":"2016-08-30T22:32:51","slug":"quality-assurance-sinks-sub","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/leanqualitysystems.com\/quality-assurance-sinks-sub\/","title":{"rendered":"Poor Quality Assurance can sink a submarine!"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"ThresherPoor Quality Assurance did just that, in 1963. \u00a0Lack of Quality Assurance procedures and non-adherence to standards can be just as disastrous in your environment!<\/p>\n

Let me take a step back. \u00a0I would like to share a little of my Navy Career with you so you can understand why I am so \u201cGung Ho\u201d about Quality Assurance.<\/p>\n

I entered the Navy on October 28, 1963 and the USS THRESHER (SSN-593)<\/a> was lost on April 10, 1963, so you can imagine how personal this is for me.<\/p>\n

I received extensive technical and leadership training while working on Nuclear Submarines in 1965. My Career started as a pipefitter welder and advanced to a Quality Assurance Visual and Nondestructive Testing Examiner. (that’s a big title to go with the responsibility!)<\/p>\n

By 1968, one of my areas of expertise was performing Ultrasonic Silver Braze Inspections.\u00a0 In my position,\u00a0my training was to assure non-negotiable<\/strong> compliance to all repairs and overhauls on Nuclear Submarines. \u00a0Try telling the Admiral his ship can’t leave because of a brazing! \u00a0Well, Sir, if the brazing fails, then (insert disaster here). \u00a0Sometimes I got my own brazing for the announcements! \u00a0But,\u00a0In QA, you\u00a0always have to stand your ground or face the consequences.<\/em><\/p>\n

That was, essentially, my responsibility. \u00a0To this day in the Nuclear Submarine Navy, an Officer, Engineer or even a Rear Admiral cannot reverse or negotiate a rejection made by an Inspector<\/em>.<\/p>\n

The USS THRESHER (SSN 593) is the foundation for my Quality Assurance Integrity. \u00a0<\/em>My goal is the never see another “Thresher” incident at one of my clients. \u00a0Not on my watch! \u00a0I’ve worked with\u00a0tens of thousands of workers on all types of problems.<\/p>\n

The common denominator of these problems are always complacency and non-compliance. <\/em><\/p>\n

You can read accident and incident reports from many\u00a0catastrophes and\u00a0see this pattern. \u00a0This was especially true with the Thresher, as well as in the loss of our two space shuttles, Columbia and Challenger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\"challenger\"<\/td>\n\"coloumbia\"<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

With the Thresher, here is some more history from a statement by\u00a0Rear Admiral Paul E. Sullivan, U.S. Navy Deputy Commander for Ship Design, Integration and Engineering Naval Sea Systems Command<\/a>:<\/p>\n

Before the House Science Committee on the SUBSAFE Program<\/a> 29 October 2003:<\/em><\/p>\n

USS THRESHER (SSN-593) was lost at sea with all persons aboard – 112 naval personnel and 17 civilians<\/strong>. The USS THRESHER was the leading edge fast, quiet and deep diving nuclear submarine.<\/em><\/p>\n

THRESHER had about 3000 silver-brazed piping joints exposed<\/strong> to full submergence pressure.\u00a0 During her last shipyard maintenance period 145 of these joints were inspected on a not-to-delay<\/strong> vessel basis using a new technique called Ultrasonic Testing.\u00a0\u00a0 Fourteen (14%) percent of the joints tested showed sub-standard joint integrity<\/strong>. Extrapolating these test results to the entire population of 3000 silver-brazed joints indicates that possibly more than 400 joints on THRESHER could have been sub-standard<\/strong>.\u00a0\u00a0 One or more of these joints is believed to have failed, resulting in flooding in the engine room.<\/em><\/p>\n